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Abtract: 
A wide range of the empirical studies shows to what extend the rise of supermarkets in
developing countries deeply transform domestic marketing channels. In particular, the
exclusion of small producers from the so-called dynamic marketing channels (that is
remunerative ones) is at stake. Based on original data collected in Turkey in 2007 at the
producer and the wholesale market levels, we show that  the intermediaries are decisive
in order to understand the impact of downstream restructuring (supermarkets) on
upstream decisions (producers). The results show first that producers are not aware of
the final buyer of their produce, as intermediaries hinder the visibility of the marketing
channel, their choice is restricted to that of the first intermediary. Moreover,  the
econometric   results   conclude   that   producers   who   are   indirectly   linked   to   the
supermarkets are more sensitive to their requirements in terms of quality and packaging
than to the price premia they set accordingly to the effort made to meet their standards.
Therefore, the results question the role of the wholesale market agents who act as a
buffer in the chain and protect small producers from negative shocks, but who stop
positive shocks as well, and reduce incentives.
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11. INTRODUCTION
A wide range of the empirical studies shows to what extend the rise of supermarkets in
developing countries deeply transform domestic marketing channels In particular, the
exclusion of small producers from the so-called dynamic marketing channels (that is
remunerative ones) is at stake. In fact, the procurement system chosen by supermarkets
involves purchase consolidation as regards quality and secured volumes. This leads to
requirements in terms of flows’ stability and tough private quality and safety standards.
The empirical analysis led on Africa (Weathersoon et al, 2002) and Latin America
(Reardon and al., 2003) conclude on the fact that, even though opportunities exist for
small farmers, the risks of exclusion is the highest when considering these specific
countries or regions. 
We focus on the Turkish Fresh Fruit and Vegetable (thereafter FFV) case: in fact, this
market accounts in fact for 40% of the total agricultural production in Turkey (Oskam et
al., 2004). Among other FFV tomatoes were chosen because of their weight in the total
agricultural production (9,7 millions of tons per year  (IGEME, 2006)). In addition,
tomato is a highly demanded fresh produce in the domestic market. Even though the
total share of FFV that are sold in supermarkets is rather low relatively to that of other
countries (15% of total food consumption, relatively to 60% in Brazil as early as 2000
according to Reardon and Berdegue (2002)),  FFV are more and more bought in
supermarkets (that represent almost 20% of the total consumption nowadays). However,
production is still characterized by a high number of small farms located all over the
country with about 90% of the farms endowed with less than 1h. Moreover, the
penetration of supermarkets in rural areas is hardly observable.
We argue in this article that this result depends highly on the legal environment of the
countries with respect to the regulatory framework of transactions. We show that  the
intermediaries   are   decisive   in   order   to   understand   the   impact   of   downstream
restructuring (supermarkets) on upstream decisions (producers). We draw on the
previous literature that underlines the role of specialized (or dedicated) wholesalers,
and introduce the regulatory environment to understand their role in a country where
transactions of FFV are highly centralised.
Section 2 presents the literature dealing with the restructuring of global value chain and
its consequences on the inclusion of small producers in modern marketing channels. In
this view, we underline in section 3 the specificities of the Turkish FFV market. We turn
to the empirical strategy of data collection to investigate (section 4 and 5) the
determinants of small producers' indirect participation in the supermarkets' marketing
channel.
2. SMALL PRODUCERS IN MODERN FFV MARKETS
During   the  first   of  the  1990's,   structural   adjustment   and   stabilization   programs
significantly reduced  controls  and state intervention on the agricultural products
markets in developing countries. The subsequent liberalization of products and capital
markets led to a deep transformation of the agri-food system in these countries. The
main drivers that were identified by the literature are the changes in the consumers'
demand regarding quality and safety that occurred first in rich countries (Fulponi,
22007): but the transfer of production to low-wage countries and the high level of
vertical integration of global chains translated the requirements to developing countries
(Swinnen, 2005). This integration in global trade, and in particular in high-value supply
chains, is advocated as promoting growth and poverty reduction (Aksoy and Beghin,
2005), even though the topic remains controversial. Horticultural products were proved,
in that respect, to generate expected high revenues per unit of land (Weinberger and
Lumpkin, 2007) and are known to be a labour intensive production.  Recently, the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) has expressed
more interest in fruit and vegetable production and research on high value crops has
been identified as a system priority (CGIAR, 2004). The focus was then on the demand
from developed countries.
Moreover, further factors are emphasized by Reardon and Timmer (2007) as having a
much greater impact on the domestic agri-food systems: the restructuring of the
domestic food markets, and the emergence and evolution of new actors belonging to
domestic chains (intermediaries, cooperatives, food service segments) and foreign direct
investments (thereafter FDI) that impact this restructuring. In fact, the authors argue that
the exposure to exports is relatively low for developing countries, especially in the case
of fruit and vegetables (respectively 12% and 2% of total output in 2001) and that no
decisive evolution was observed since 1980. On the contrary, they underline the rise of
FDIs in the food sector, namely in processing and retail. This emergence resulted in an
increased level of requirements as regards quality and safety, with a notable evolution of
multinational retailers towards convergence between private standards applied by the
chain in developed countries and in developing countries (Reardon and Farina, 2002).
Moreover, supermarkets require the consistency of the produce they buy by producers
and cut costs by relying on economies of scale when procuring large volumes. Their
procurement system is therefore relatively different from that of traditional retailers
(Reardon et al., 2003): dedicated wholesalers are more prone to meet the requirements
of   supermarkets,   invest   in   costly   relationship-specific   assets   and   develop   their
organisational and managerial skills; the centralisation of sales sharpens this evolution
by relying on low search costs and thus turning to large suppliers.  
A wide empirical literature has developed since the 1990's on the impact of the
marketing   channel   restructuring   at   the   producer   level,   especially   in   developing
countries. In fact, the increased level of requirements was viewed as a barrier for small
producers who couldn’t bear the cost of delivering produce to the supermarkets. 
Small farms were found to suffer under diseconomies of scale in producing quality as
regard the small size of the cultivated area relatively to the necessary investment in
capital, specific practices and organisation of the production. Moreover, the budgetary
and liquidity constraints of small producers don’t allow them to invest and adapt
(Boselie et al, 2003). They thus can't cover the transaction costs to access remunerative
markets, such as searching for a business partner, supervising and monitoring the
production process in order to guarantee the quality level of the delivered produce, or
the costs to enforce an agreement in a weak environment (Minten et al., 2007). 
The early literature on the subject is mainly empirical, and rather pessimistic: Several
studies of farm communities in Latin America and Africa showed that small producers
were left-behind in the marketing channels restructuring driven by the supermarkets
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000, Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003 or Reardon and al.,
2003 for instance).  
3More recent empirical research proposes however a more moderate view. Dries and
Swinnen (2004) find that standards lead to increased vertical coordination in the chain
and to the emergence of contracting in the case of the dairy processing industry in
Central   European   countries.   They   show   that   contracting   doesn't   exclude   small
producers, but that, on the reversal, they improve the access to credit and quality inputs.
Minten et al. (2009) and Maertens and Swinnen (2009) also find an increased vertical
coordination in the case of Madagascar and Senegal from which small farmers benefit.
They also emphasized the fact that the chain restructuring can stimulate job creation and
that producers should benefit from this evolution through the labour market. However,
those studies focus on success stories, and the question of the replicability of the models
applied in these cases is raised by other researchers (Minot and Ngigi, 2004).
The most recent stream of literature dealing with the emergence of modern supply
chains and its influence at the producer level aims at modelling the impact of
procurement systems in developing countries. Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) and
Swinnen and al. (2008) analyse the role of standards on growth and development.
Marcoul and Veyssière (2008) study the way supermarkets monitor the production
process in order to guarantee quality by lending money to producers. These models
show   that   there   are   conditions   under   which   producers   may   benefit   from   the
modernization of the supply chain. 
One last paper from Wang et al. (2009) shows that, in China, the penetration of
supermarkets in rural areas is rather low. However, the downstream part of the food
chain evolved rapidly with a large number of urban consumers purchasing food in
supermarkets and restaurants. The authors propose that supermarkets mainly procure the
produce   from   the   numerous   wholesale   markets   located   around   Beijing,   so   that
producers are not directly exposed to downstream restructuring.
We   propose   to   further   investigate   this   issue   and   integrate   the   role   of   market
intermediation in the analysis of the market restructuring and its impact on producers.
Drawing on the previous literature on supermarkets, we distinguish thereby between the
a production function and a marketing function whose costs, benefits and risk are borne
by two different entities.  
Concerning the costs, the requirements of the supermarkets may be matched either by
the producer, or by the intermediary. Some of them related to the production process can
be achieved by the producers only, but the wholesale market agents can upgrade the
produce as well. Reardon et al. (2009) underline the fact that the wholesale sector
evolved   towards   consolidation   and   improved   as   regards   logistics   and
multinationalisation. The emergence of wholesale market agents “dedicated” to modern
food industry clients is observed in many countries: those intermediaries are in charged
to source from farmers produce which meet the supermarkets' requirements and rely
therefore on vertical coordination. However, in the case where they act as market-
makers and not only as match-makers, they can add value to the produce as well and
substancially lower the search costs as they rely on a large business network.. 
Concerning the benefits, the prices incentives set by supermarkets to cover the costs of
the provision of quality produce should, at least partly, translate up the supply chain at
the producer level.
In this case, the intermediaries may act as a buffer in the marketing channel in face of a
large-scale down-stream market restructuring, but as a conductor for incentives to
procure quality.
43.   THE   TURKISH   FFV   MARKET:   STRUCTURE;   REGULATION   AND
CONSEQUENCES
3.1 Fresh fruit and vegetables in Turkey
This concern is particularly important in Turkey as the role of agriculture is still
predominant for the economy; it represents 9% of the GDP in 2006 and agricultural
employment is estimated at 27.7% of the working population (TUIK, 2007): around
seven million people are directly employed in agriculture, that is about the same number
as in the entire EU-15 (Oskam et al, 2004). Trade liberalization and the rising demand in
the region resulted in agricultural product exports (excluding agro-industry) rising to a
value of approximately US$ 3.5 billion in 2005, that is 4.8% of Turkey’s total export
earnings. Concerning tomatoes, Turkey was in 2005 the third tomato producer after
China and USA with a total production of nearly 10 million tons (FAO Stat, 2005).
However, the production is still highly fragmented with about 3 million farms (Oskam
et al, 2004), mainly family managed, and located all over the country. Nevertheless, at
the aggregate level, Turkey is a major producer and at the same time a major consumer
of tomatoes as tomato is a highly demanded fresh produce in domestic market. 
Turkish consumers however still procure the major part of the fresh fruit and vegetables
they consume on open street markets. The Turkish food retail sector is still relatively
fragmented. Traditional family-run outlets (bakkals), open area markets and bazaars are
still widespread all over the country, especially in rural areas and small towns where
modern grocery formats do not exist yet. The modern retail channel is rather low.
However, its role is growing, and Turkey is considered as a strategic place for direct
foreign investment. The share of hypermarkets and supermarkets in food retail sales was
about 40 per cent in 2002 and currently is approaching 50 per cent. However, only 15 to
20% of the fresh fruit and vegetables consumed in the domestic markets are sold in
modern marketing channels (Koç et al. 2007). 
3.2 Market regulation
The FFV market is in Turkey still highly regulated and centralized. The 1995 wholesale
market law oblige producers to market their produce through a so called commissioner
(komisyoncu). The latter is a broker who sells the produce on behalf of the producer.
The producer sets the minimum price at which he wants to sell his production, the
commissioner acts then as a matchmaker and doesn't take ownership of the produce. His
commission (in percentage and according to the volume sold) is set by the law: no more
than 8% of the total price should be directed to him. But, as commissioners are not
numerous on the wholesale markets, and as the establishment and location of the
wholesale markets are decided by the municipalities, no strong competition among the
commissioners   is   observable,   and   always   the   highest   commission   is   charged.
Commissioners are located inside the wholesale markets, and handle the goods that
producers are delivering to them, or merchants, that gather (namely buy) the produce of
selected areas and deliver it to the commissioners. 
However, the 1995 wholesale market law takes into account the fact that direct sales,
namely that are not made through a commissioner, are possible. In fact, marketing
cooperatives (called agricultural development cooperatives) that are registered at the
5Ministry of Rural Affairs are allowed to directly sell to final sellers (traditional markets,
as well as supermarkets), and can afford a physical location on the wholesale markets.
The conditions under which a producer organization can afford the certificate that
allows it to bypass the commissioner, and thus the commission that should be paid, are
hard to meet for these organisations. The cooperative should gather more than 50
members which is a constraint at the village level.
But, several laws were passed since then, and first allow since 2005 (enacted 2006)
marketing cooperatives to emerge. Even if an agricultural development cooperative
exists at the village level, producers can gather together in a marketing cooperative that
is eligible to directly sell to final marketer, such as supermarket, under restrictive
conditions (Bignebat, Codron, Lemeilleur, 2007) if they gather more than 10% of the
total district area. Marketing cooperatives are headed by large producers that try to
organize small producers in order to match the requirements of the law. Last credit
cooperatives were allowed to market their members' production. They are deviating
from their first aim (credit) and market produce for their member. 
4. DATA COLLECTION, DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
The empirical study was led in the framework of the Regoverning Markets programme
(www.regoverningmarkets.org). We collected data at the producer (183 producers
including the fresh and the industry tomato supply chains) and the wholesale market
level (198 wholesale market agents), matched both data bases and tried to track the
produce along the marketing channel. 
Based on the 2004 data of the Farmer Record System, the study site consists in 4
provinces on the Mediterranean and Aegean coasts and in Marmara region Each region
has particular economic, social and climatic conditions which enables to produce
tomatoes throughout the year and also diversifies the marketing choice for tomato
producers.
Graph 1: surveyed regions
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 94.1.  Producer level data
Producer surveys were led from December 2006 to February 2007. villages were
selected randomly. The village questionnaire was answered preferably by the head of
the municipality, or by the cooperative director, and if they were not available, by old
producers.  The   selection   of   the   households   was   made   according   to   their   land
endowment (half at the bottom and half at the top of the distribution). Producers were
chosen randomly, and interviews were conducted in the coffee house of the village, on a
face-to-face basis. 
4.2 Wholesale markets data
We conducted a further survey at the wholesale markets’ level in order to identify the
producers that are selling to the supermarkets. Wholesale markets that are engaged in
transactions   with   supermarkets   were   targeted:   commissioners   in  Antalya,   Serik,
Kumuluca were interviewed on a face-to-face basis in January and February 2007; and
those located in Istanbul and Bursa by phone in June 2007. For the first three wholesale
markets, the survey was exhaustive, for the rest, only commissioners that were
suspected to deal with the supermarkets were investigated (namely on wholesale
markets that supply supermarkets). They were asked about the marketing channels they
were choosing, and about the volume they were marketing in each of them. We selected
the following marketing channels: traditional open markets (Pazar), supermarkets
(whereby we can distinguish between Migros – local original supermarket chain -, and
others), and exports. . 
The individual producer data was matched with the wholesale markets data thanks to
the report by the producer of the intermediary’s number and wholesale market name.
We  are   thus   able   to   know   about   identity   of   the   “second   buyer”
1,   namely  the
intermediary’s buyer. 
1 We call it “second buyer” for convenience, but as the commissioner doesn't take ownership of the
produce, he is rather the second link.
74.3. Marketing channel choice and descriptive results
Marketing channels
Only 2 producers report that they directly sell to the supermarkets, and 2 directly to
exporters (and one of them procure directly both marketing channels). They were drop
out of the data base. Direct procurement either from the exporters, or even less from the
supermarkets is scarcely observable. 
First, supermarkets are due to prove their procurement and sales at the end of each year
so that they can't avoid the legal obligation they are facing to pass through the wholesale
markets and commissioners. But the legal binding doesn't hold as far as they are trading
with a cooperative. In consequence, few examples of supermarkets trying to organize
producers into producers' unions can be found at the moment, especially in the region of
Antalya.
As regards the export sector, it should be underlined that, even though Turkey is the 3
rd
producer in the world economy (in volumes), the share of the production which is
exported is about 2,5%. Tozanli and El Hadad (2007) show moreover that the
enterprises that contract with the exporting firms are large (about 200 permanent
workers). As our study only concerns small producers that are hardly exposed to
exports, we won’t take into account the export marketing channel
We observed few organisational innovations in terms of alternative modes of marketing,
in particular as concerns collective action. First, the qualitative surveys underline the
difficulty of collective action to organize (Lemeilleur et al, 2007).   As a result, 39
producers report that there is a development or marketing cooperative in their village,
but only 6 of them are a coop member. Finally, none of them market their whole
produce through the cooperatives.
Therefore, the role of the commissioners seems to remain dominant in the most
common marketing channel scheme. This has a direct impact on the analysis of the
marketing channel choice. We tried to cross the information at the commissioner level
with a question asked to the producer about the “second buyer” of his produce (Table 1).
When  looking at the  commissioner’s  marketing channels reported  by either the
producers or the commissioners, a significant difference is observable. 
Table 1: Question “Are you (Is your commissioner) selling to supermarkets?”
Reported by their
commissioner
Reported by the producers Yes No
Yes 3 (57%) 4 (43%) 7
No 15 (53%) 23 (47%) 38
Total 18 27 45
We conclude that the answer given by the producer and the commissioner are
contradictory for around half of the cases. The producer is not choosing a marketing
channel, but rather a wholesale market agent. Moreover, only 45 out of 183 answer the
question, the remaining part reported that they don't know to whom the wholesale
8market agent is selling.
Choice of the wholesale market agent
Moreover, more than 80% of the producers who are selling on the wholesale markets
rely on only one commissioner. Producers proved to be rather faithful to their
commissioner and rarely switch from one to the other. The producer were asked to
report and rank the reasons why they choose a buyer: the confidence built in a long term
relationship turned out to be chosen by a majority of producers with 15% of them
referring to the fact that they like to know him and prefer not to switch from wholesale
market agent relatively to the previous year, 16% relying on his reputation (“the
commissioner has been working here for a long time”) and 17% directly referring to his
honesty. 
A further reason for this stability in the relationships between producers and wholesale
market agents is that commissioners supply credit. Producers frequently report to suffer
from credit shortage: interlinked contracts with the commissioners (advanced payment
or even credit for  production) are widespread. 65% of the producers in the sample
report to get advanced payment from the commissioner. However, the same proportion
of the populations having or not access to credit by the commissioners were granted a
loan in the traditional banking system (banks or credit cooperatives).  
However, 35% of the producers report that their choice is driven by the price they can
get from the commissioner. Therefore, the price incentives set by supermarkets to
procure quality produce should partly translate to the producers.
As concerns the supermarkets' requirements, none of the producers report getting
technical assistance from the wholesale markets agents. However, about half of the
sample report having changed the variety they produce according to the buyers'
preferences.
5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY, RESULTS WITH INTERMEDIATION
From the matched data set, we identified producers that have a positive probability to
procure the supermarkets. In fact, the produce is more often than not managed in bulk
by the commissioner, and there is no possibility to trace it back to the producer.
However, from the wholesale markets data base we know the proportion of the volumes
sold by the commissioners to the supermarkets. We use it as a continuous endogenous
variables. 39 producers have thus a strictly positive probability to sell to supermarket: at
least, they are linked and thus indirectly exposed to supermarkets. We use a tobit model
using the following set of exogenous variables, we selected variables (description in
table 2) related to farm and producer characteristics, to location and local environment,
and to commissioner characteristics. The expected influence of each of them is
introduced in the discussion of the results.
Table 2: variable description and statistics
Farm
characteristics Mean St. Err.
Percentage
tomato 2002
Percentage of total land allocated to tomato production in
2002 (ratio) 14,49 23,4
9Total land 2002 Total land area (decare, namely 0.1 hectare)) 0,66 0,35
Glasshouses
2002 Area of glasshouses relatively to total area in 2002, % 0,29 0,41










children  Number of children living on the farm in 2006 1,07 0,92
Bank credit
2002 
1 if the producer has a credit in a bank in 2002 (0
otherwise) 0,36
Household characteristics
Age  Age of the household head 2006, number of years 43,92 9,18
Age squared Age of the household head 2006 squared 2012,92 835,09
Experience  Experience in production, number of years 2006 17,18 9,25
Experience
squared  Experience in production, number of years squared 2006 380,14 362,81
Has a car 1 if the household has a car 0,62
Shifters














Distance to road Distance from the plots to the proximate road (kilometres) 0,63 1,47
Distance to road















Commissioner 1 if the commissioner is in charged of only packing the 0,41




1 if the commissioner is in charged of grading and packing






















1 if the producer doesn't know the date at which the




1 if the producer's criteria for choosing a commissioner is
the price (0 otherwise) 0,35
Producer packs 1 if the producer packs the produce (0 if no packing) 0,18
Producer sorts 1 if the producer sorts the produce (0 if no sorting) 0,32
We cluster the data at the regional level to allow for the covariation of the residuals, and
thus of unobserved variability, within regions. We use lagged variables referring to the
year 2002 for variables that are suspected to be endogenous. In fact, we believe that the
lag is long enough to allow to conclude on causality, and the economic and financial
crisis of 2000-2001 doesn't allow us to use a wider date difference. The results are
presented in table 3 (p.18).
Economies of scale, investment and the supermarkets
Size and specialization
We introduced variables standing for the farm’s size and specialization in the fresh to-
mato production we focus on. Berdegue et al. (2005) for Guatemala, and Reardon et al.
(2007) for Mexico, show that the leading chains source from large growers, especially
in front of a dualistic sector such as tomatoes in Mexico or bananas and mangoes in
Guatemala. However, the chains source from small farmers when they face a sector
dominated by small farmers. The result seems to hold for Turkey as the land size has no
significant influence on the probability to sell to the supermarket (Total land 2002),
even when controlling for the fact that tomatoes can be grown with a higher productiv-
ity per unit of land under glasshouses (Glasshouses 2002).
Some studies, however, show that in case of increasing returns on a highly specialized
production, producers may find a niche (Neven et al., 2002). But in the Turkey, the con-
centration of production in tomato decreases the probability to be engaged in the super-
market marketing channel. 
Investment in physical capital
11We introduced in the regression the proportion of the land covered with glasshouses,
and that dedicated to open field production (reference, plastic houses or tunnels). None
of them turned out to be significant. However, the investment in fixed capital was
proven to be one of the obstacles of entering modern marketing channels. Berdegue et al
(2007) show that having crop-specific farm equipment was a key requirement for enter-
ing the strawberry processing sector. In fact, Turkish consumers didn't change much in
their willingness to pay for produce characteristics, and observable traditional features
are the most rewarded (Tozanli and El Hadad, 2007). Therefore, open field tomatoes
still represents the major part of the tomatoes grown in Turkey and mostly sold on open
air markets.
Human capital and the supermarkets
The experience as an agricultural producer has a negative impact on the fact to be linked
to supermarkets. Moreover, when integrating the educational level of the household
head (which may be linked to a generational effect), the latter variable turns out to be
non significant. We conclude that the youngest generations are more prone to be linked
to supermarkets, regardless the educational level. Moreover, most of the interviewees
were born in the same village (or subprovince) where they are active at the survey time,
so that we can think that only few of them were drawn by the opportunities they can
have in establishing as producers only to supply supermarkets.
Market access
The literature identifies further obstacles to market participation. In particular, it
underlines the institutional and physical infrastructure necessary to ensure a regularly
access to competitive markets (Barrett, 2008). From the theoretical point of view,
multiple market participation equilibria may arise, due to sunk costs investments and
coordination problems (Barrett and Swallow, 2006).
Remoteness 
Farm location as an obstacle to accessing market was thoroughly documented by the
literature . Transportation costs were proved to be high relatively to the expected returns
of the sales. In our case, the higher the distance between the plots and the proximate
asphalt road, the lower the probability to indirectly deliver supermarkets. Moreover, we
draw from the descriptive statistics that those located in remote areas relatively to large
roads are less likely to get information on prices. 
However, this effect may be due to the village location rather than to the farm location,
so that we introduce the distance to the wholesale market the producer is selling on to
capture the remoteness relatively to large consumption areas. We find the opposite
effect, with a probability to sell to supermarkets which is increasing with the distance to
the wholesale market. This result is partly due to the fact that the wholesale market
located in Antalya attracts a large number of producers as this is the largest one in the
region (counting more than 300 commissioners). However, when controlling for the fact
that the wholesale market the producer is procuring is that of Antalya, the result remains
robust.
Marketing organisations
We investigate the role of cooperatives as marketing organisation and as technical
support providers. In fact, collective action can help producers overcome specific
marketing constraints (Sexton and Iskow, 1988) by benefiting from economies of scales,
12building a marketing network, improving technologies. However, the authors note that
public or club good provision may lead to coordination problems. The latter statement is
apparently relevant for Turkey: the results show that either the presence of a marketing
cooperative (Cooperative) in  the village, or the fact that the cooperative provides
technical assistance (Technical assistance from a cooperative) has a negative influence
on the probability to be engaged in a modern marketing channel. In fact, active producer
organisations are rare (Lemeilleur et al., 2007) and often inherited from the socialist
collectivist system which is more often than not now rejected by producers. 
Intermediation and the link to supermarkets
Dedicated wholesale market agents: procurement strategies or grading?
The supermarket marketing channel is characterized by a specific procurement system
that should assure the consistency of the produce they buy. Therefore, they adopt
organizational innovations such as a shift from the reliance on spot markets towards a
growing use of “specialized wholesalers” (Reardon and Timmer, 2007).  The results
show that the probability for a producer to indirectly supply the supermarkets is higher
when he grades and packs the produce himself (Producer pack and Producer sorts),
rather than externalizing this marketing activity to the commissioner (Commissioner
packs only and Commissioner packs and grades). The result is not straightforward as
the major part of the producers (about 65%) report that their commissioner is packing
and/or grading the produce himself. This observation was confirmed in field surveys
whereby commissioners say more often than not that they prefer to internalize the
sorting and grading and supervise it.
The choice of wholesale market agents?
Last, we introduce some variables concerning the commissioner characteristic (reported
by the producer) and the producer decision criteria. We aim therefore at distinguishing
the effect of trust (Experience with the commissioner) and reputation (Established after
1995) of the commissioner in the producer decision and that of price incentives.
The duration of the relationship between the producer and the commissioner is
positively correlated to the probability to be linked to supermarkets. However, the
commissioners who established after 1995 are less likely to sell to supermarket. We
introduce as well the fact that the producer doesn't know the age of the firm held by his
commissioner, namely doesn't care about it and the result shows that the effect on the
probability to sell to the supermarkets is even stronger than that of the youngest firms.
Therefore, we think that the probability to sell to the  supermarkets is not  necessarily
linked, in the producers' view, with the fact that the commissioner is newly established.
Moreover, the producers who report to choose their commissioner according to the price
they can offer is negatively correlated to the probability to be linked to supermarkets.
However, the premium paid by supermarkets to procure first quality produce on the
wholesale is about 20%. 
CONCLUSION
We draw on the previous literature on the impact of the rise of supermarkets on small
producers in developing countries, and propose to investigate the role of intermediation
in assessing and understanding this impact. 
Based on Turkish data, we show first that intermediation remain from far the most
common marketing channel chosen by small producers. Due to the legislation and the
13market   structure,   direct   supply   to   supermarkets   and   exporters   is   a   marginal
phenomenon. Moreover, there are few original marketing organisations that could
promote the access to remunerative markets, in particular, cooperatives are rare and
their members not active.
We show then that, given this predominance of intermediation, producers are mostly
unaware of the identity of their intermediary's clients, that is to the client they are finally
selling to. The accumulation of links between the producers and the final buyer leads to
an opacity of the chain from the producer's point of view.
Given this results, we introduce in a standard model of market participation variables
about the intermediary used by the producer. We try to figure out to which extend the
intermediation is a conductor for the incentives to produce quality set downstream, in
terms of requirements and remuneration. 
We conclude that the producer that are linked to supermarkets seem to have integrated
the marketing activities related to the specific requirements of the modern marketing
channels, namely grading and packing, but that they are not sensitive to the price
premium the supermarkets offer for this effort. It can't be ruled out that the choice of the
intermediary relies on criteria other than pure market ones: reputation and trust play a
large role in this decision even though the wholesale markets are in Turkey highly
regulated – with invoices, with a regulated commission rate – and monitored. However,
further investigations should test for econometric problems (reverse causality for the
variable standing for the duration of the relationship for instance).
14Table 3: endogenous variable, proportion of total produce sold to supermarkets
Farm characteristics
Percentage tomato 2002 0,0597      (0,0877)
Total land 2002 -34,12*** (8,238)
Glasshouses 2002 2,158        (1,666)
Open Field 2002 5,92          (5,248)
Incentives
ratio off-farm/agricultural income 5,621          (8,56)
Risks
Number of children  -0,0940       (1,143)
Bank credit 2002  0,441          (3,324)
Household characteristics
Age  2,451          (2,601)
Age squared -0,042         (0,034)
Experience  -2,671***    (0,529)
Experience squared  0,0736***    (0,020)
Has a car -2,412          (3,817)
Shifters
Cooperative -13,88***    (4,882)
Technical assistance from the government -5,731          (5,012)
Technical assistance from the cooperative -3,016*        (1,671)
Market access
Distance to road   -13,85**      (5,986)
Distance to road squared 1,381**       (0,542)
Distance to wholesale market  1,831***     (0,165)
Distance to wholesale market squared -0,015**     (0,0012)
Commissioner/Producer characteristics
Commissioner packs only -16,36*      (9,190)
Commissioner packs and grades -26,17***   (8,414)
Experience with the commissioner  1,828**     (0,874)
Experience with the commissioner squared -0,0399***  (0,014)
Established after 1995 10,16***     (1,697)
Don't know the date of establishment 17,79***     (4,652)
Price most important  -12,12***    (4,390)
Producer packs 13,824**     (1,709)
Producer sorts 25,87***     (7,304)
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